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Summary  This  study  examines  the  agency  costs  of  314  family  ﬁrms  listed  on  Shanghai  and
Shenzhen  Stock  Exchange  in  China.  The  results  show  that  agency  costs  of  family  ﬁrms  increase
signiﬁcantly  with  the  enhancement  of  family’s  ownership  and  the  separation  of  ownership  and
control, while  family  involvement  in  management  can  reduce  the  agency  costs.  By  includingConfucianism the variable  proxying  internal  control  and  the  interaction  term  between  internal  control  and
family involvement  in  the  empirical  model,  we  still  ﬁnd  that  the  effects  of  family  involvement
on agency  costs  are  contingent  on  the  quality  of  internal  control.
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Introduction
Family  ﬁrms  are  the  most  ancient  form  of  organizational
structure,  and  play  an  important  role  in  the  modern  eco-
nomic  life.  Approximately  two-thirds  of  private  businesses
are  family  owned  over  the  world  (Neubauer  and  Lank,
1998).  In  the  Fortune  global  500  companies,  175  ﬁrms
are  controlled  by  family.  Since  the  reform  and  opening
up,  China’s  family  ﬁrms  have  experienced  unprecedented
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evelopment.  According  to  the  latest  statistics  released
y  the  State  Administration  for  Industry  and  Commerce
f  China,  the  number  of  private  enterprise  dominated
y  family  has  exceeded  10  million  by  the  end  of  2014,
ccounting  for  more  than  60%  of  China’s  GDP.
Family  ﬁrms  are  linked  with  blood  relationship  and  kin-
hip  ties.  In  light  of  classical  agency  theory,  such  a  guan-xi
ulture  is  helpful  to  alleviate  the  interest  conﬂict  within
he  ﬁrm  and  reduce  the  agency  costs.  Therefore,  family
rms  are  considered  the  most  efﬁcient  forms  of  organiza-
ion  (Fama  and  Jensen,  1983a;  Daily  and  Dollinger,  1992).
owever,  Schulze  et  al.  (2001,  2003)  challenge  the  clas-
ical  agency  theory.  They  argue  that  family  ﬁrms  may  be
ubjected  to  higher  agency  costs  because  of  conﬂicts  asso-
iated  with  private  ownership  and  owner’s  self-control,
s  well  as  those  posed  by  asymmetric  altruism,  so  that
he  performance  is  rather  lower  than  that  of  non-family
rms.
icle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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This  study  contributes  to  the  literatures  on  agency  prob-
ems  within  family  ﬁrms  in  the  following  ways.  Firstly,  most
esearches  treat  family  ﬁrms  as  a  homogeneous  group,  ignor-
ng  the  difference  in  the  way  that  the  controlling  family
ay  inﬂuence  a  ﬁrm.  Following  the  approach  of  Villalonga
nd  Amit  (2006,  2009),  this  study  takes  into  account  the
ifferences  in  family  ﬁrms  by  distinguishing  among  three
undamental  elements  in  the  family  involvement,  namely,
wnership,  control,  and  management.  Secondly,  in  a  social
ontext  in  which  family  takes  on  particular  meaning,  we
re  able  to  investigate  the  inﬂuence  of  traditional  Confu-
ian  values  on  the  agency  costs  in  Chinese  family  ﬁrms.  The
nique  sample  not  only  ﬁlls  the  empirical  void  for  emerging
arkets  but  also  enriches  the  understanding  of  the  sector.
inally,  considering  the  characteristics  of  China’s  Account-
ng  Standard  and  the  availability  of  data,  we  use  perquisite
onsumption  and  inefﬁcient  investment  as  two  new  proxies
or  the  agency  costs.
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  In  the
ext  section  we  present  the  theoretical  analysis  and  develop
ur  hypotheses.  We  then  detail  the  methodology  in  the  third
ection.  We  present  the  empirical  results  and  discuss  the
mplication  of  our  ﬁndings  in  the  fourth  section.  Finally,  we
onclude  the  paper  with  its  limitations  and  provide  some
uggestions  for  future  research.
heoretical analysis and hypothesis
evelopment
nterest  conﬂicts  and  information  asymmetry  are  the  basic
auses  of  the  agency  costs  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976).  The
lassical  agency  theory  documents  that  the  family  ﬁrms  rep-
esent  one  of  the  least  costly  and  most  efﬁcient  forms  of
rganization  for  the  following  reasons.  First,  in  the  fam-
ly  business,  ownership  mainly  concentrates  in  the  family
embers  with  blood  relationship,  such  a  ‘‘private  prop-
rty’’  can  ensure  the  consistency  of  family  agents’  pursuit
ith  the  interests  of  the  whole  enterprise,  so  as  to  allevi-
te  the  agency  tension  caused  by  interest  conﬂict  (Fama
nd  Jensen,  1983a);  Second,  the  mutual  communication
nd  coordination  among  family  members  are  more  conve-
ient,  which  help  to  reduce  the  agency  costs  elicited  from
nformation  asymmetry  (Fama  and  Jensen,  1983b;  Daily  and
ollinger,  1992).  Accordingly,  the  following  hypothesis  is
roposed:
1.  The  agency  costs  of  family  ﬁrms  are  lower  than  non-
amily  ﬁrms.
However,  family  ﬁrms  are  not  a  homogeneous  group  with
he  same  sets.  Family  involvement  always  differs  greatly  in
wnership,  control  and  management.  The  controlling  family
lways  holds  a  larger  proportion  of  equity,  which  can  ensure
he  consistence  of  interests  inside  enterprise  and  reduce
he  agency  costs  caused  by  interest  conﬂicts.  But  with
he  expansion  of  scale,  family  ﬁrms  tend  to  attract  exter-
al  capital.  Through  the  cross-shareholding  and  ‘‘pyramid’’
tructure,  controlling  shareholders  can  achieve  dominant
osition  with  less  ownership.  Such  a  separation  of  ownership
nd  control  is  most  pronounced  among  family-controlled
rms  (Claessens  et  al.,  2000;  Faccio  and  Lang,  2002).  The
l
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ntry  of  external  capital  exacerbates  the  interest  conﬂicts
etween  the  controlling  family  and  other  shareholders  and
xerts  adverse  effects  on  the  control  of  agency  costs.  In
ddition,  family  involvement  in  management  is  also  a  key
ttribute  distinguishing  family  ﬁrms  from  non-family  ﬁrms.
ompared  with  the  non-family  managers,  family  managers
end  to  view  the  fulﬁlment  of  family  business  goals  as  intrin-
ic.  They  always  subordinate  their  personal  interests  to
orking  towards  the  organizational  interests,  leading  to  no
r  little  agency  problems  (Chrisman  et  al.,  2007;  Karra  et  al.,
006).  Accordingly,  the  following  hypotheses  are  proposed:
2.  Family  ownership  relates  with  the  agency  costs  of  fam-
ly  ﬁrms  negatively.
3.  The  separation  of  family  ownership  and  control  relates
ith  the  agency  costs  of  family  ﬁrms  positively.
4.  Family  involvement  in  management  relates  with  the
gency  costs  of  family  ﬁrms  negatively.
While  family  involvement  is  common  practice  in  family
rms  across  cultures,  its  meaning  and  role  is  contextual
nd  culture-speciﬁc.  China  is  the  birthplace  of  the  Con-
ucianism.  Confucianism  is  woven  into  the  very  fabric  of
hinese  society,  and  contributes  distinctive  characteristics
o  Chinese  family  ﬁrms.  Confucianism  stresses  the  reciprocal
enevolence  between  persons.  Such  a reciprocal  relation-
hip  underpins  the  family  hierarchical  order  and  social
armony  in  China.  In  the  business  context,  the  benevolence
f  family  business  owners  towards  other  members  always
anifests  in  the  positioning  them  in  senior  managerial  roles.
o  return  the  favour,  family  managers  always  display  strong
sychological  allegiance  and  commitment  to  the  enterprise.
utual  obligation  can  reduce  individual  opportunism  of  fam-
ly  agents’  and  agency  costs  of  ﬁrms  accordingly  (Kim  and
ao,  2013).  More  importantly,  Confucianism  promotes  ﬁl-
al  piety,  submission  and  obedience  of  subordinates  towards
uperiors,  which  are  likely  to  induce  steward-like  behaviour
f  family  manager  and  contribute  to  the  solution  of  agency
roblems  (Bell,  2010).
However,  Confucian  values  prevalent  in  Chinese  family
rms  may  also  exert  negative  effects  on  the  agency  prob-
ems.  As  mentioned  above,  the  personnel  recruitment  and
romotion  of  key  positions  are  often  made  based  on  family
uperior’s  personal  preference,  rather  than  formal  systems
nd  procedures.  It  easily  leads  to  the  entry  of  unquali-
ed  family  members  into  the  business.  Even  worse  are  that
hese  people  still  enjoy  the  privileges  and  their  behaviours
re  always  beyond  the  control.  In  addition,  Confucianism
tresses  the  strict  ethics  and  hierarchical  order,  which  easily
nduce  the  paternalism  of  family  superior.  Owning  to  the  lack
f  scientiﬁc  decision-making  procedures  in  many  China’s
amily  ﬁrms,  the  irrational  strategies  and  inefﬁcient  invest-
ent  decisions  are  often  made  by  family  superior  based  on
ndividual  experiences  or  judgments,  thus  exacerbating  the
gency  problems.  This  is  the  important  reason  that  many
hinese  family  ﬁrms  fail  in  operation.
Fortunately,  with  the  entry  of  western  management  phi-
osophy  and  the  promotion  of  modern  enterprise  system  by
hinese  government,  nepotism  and  paternalism  permeat-
ng  in  Chinese  family  ﬁrms  have  been  inhibited  to  a  large
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interest  conﬂict  and  reduce  the  agency  costs.  So  the  sign
of  the  coefﬁcient  of  Size  is  an  empirical  issue.  Firm  age
(Age).  In  general,  the  longer  the  ﬁrm’s  age  is,  the  sounder
the  governance  mechanism  is,  so  the  agency  costs  tend  toFamily  involvement,  internal  control  and  agency  costs  
extent  in  recent  years.  Most  Chinese  family  ﬁrms  have  estab-
lished  formal  internal  control  system  to  offset  the  negative
inﬂuence  of  Confucian  values.  Internal  control  is  a  process
which  is  carried  out  by  board  of  directors,  management  and
other  staff  and  aims  to  provide  reasonable  assurance  for
the  following  objectives:  (i)  the  efﬁciency  and  effective-
ness  of  operation;  (ii)  the  reliability  of  ﬁnancial  reporting;
(iii)  compliance  with  related  laws  (COSO,  1992).  In  light  of
contingency  theory,  the  behaviour  of  agents  is  contingent  on
situational  or  psychological  factors  speciﬁc  to  a  ﬁrm  (Davis
et  al.,  1997).  Under  the  pressure  and  restraint  of  inter-
nal  control,  the  irrational  and  opportunistic  behaviour  of
family  members  can  be  prevented  and  discovered  in  time.
More  importantly,  internal  control  can  ensure  the  reliabil-
ity  of  ﬁnancial  reports  (Ashbaugh-Skaife  and  Collins,  2008;
Chan  et  al.,  2008),  which  facilitates  principals  to  obtain
relevant  information  about  agents’  behaviour  and  ﬁrm’s
performance,  so  as  to  reduce  the  agency  costs  caused  by
information  asymmetry.  Accordingly,  the  following  hypoth-
esis  is  proposed:
H5.  The  association  between  family  involvement  and
agency  costs  is  more  pronounced  in  ﬁrms  with  high-quality
internal  control.
Research methodology
Sample  and  data
We  start  with  a  base  sample  consisting  of  all  the  non-
ﬁnancial  ﬁrms  listed  on  the  Chinese  Shanghai  and  Shenzhen
Stock  Exchange  in  2012.  We  then  identify  family  ﬁrms
using  the  following  criteria:  (i)  The  ultimate  controlling
shareholder  of  a  ﬁrm  is  individual  or  family;  (ii)  The
controlling  family  is  the  largest  shareholder;  (iii)  The  fam-
ily  ultimate  ownership  is  over  20%.  The  ownership  data
are  hand  collected  from  ﬁrms’  annual  reports.  We  also
search  relevant  information  on  Internet  in  order  to  iden-
tify  the  family  members  and  their  relationship.  Financial
data  and  corporate  governance  data  are  from  CCERDATA
and  http://www.cninfo.com.cn/.  Our  ﬁnal  sample  consists
of  314  family  ﬁrms.
Variable  deﬁnition
Dependent  variables
(i)  Agency  costs  associated  with  perquisite  consumption
of  agents(AC1):  Since  perquisite  consumption  of  senior
executives  is  mainly  paid  with  cash  and  most  ﬁrms  dis-
close  the  amount  and  details  of  Cash  paid  relating
to  other  operating  activities  in  the  notes  of  ﬁnan-
cial  statement,  which  includes  administrative  expenses,
travel  expenses,  entertainment  expenses,  conference
expenses,  communication  expenses,  overseas  training
fees,  expenses  of  board  of  directors  etc.,  so  we  use  the
ratio  of  Cash  paid  relating  to  other  operating  activities
to  total  assets  as  the  proxy  of  agency  costs  associated
with  perquisite  consumption.
(ii)  Agency  costs  associated  with  inefﬁcient  investment
(AC2):  Agency  conﬂict  leads  to  the  inefﬁciency  of
t
o
c47
investment,  so  we  use  inefﬁcient  investment  as  a  sec-
ond  proxy  for  agency  costs.  We  use  the  following  model
(1)  put  forward  by  Richardson  (2006)  and  revised  by  Xin
et  al.  (2007)  to  estimate  the  expected  investment  of  the
current  year  and  employ  the  residuals  of  the  regression
as  the  proxy  of  agency  costs  associated  with  inefﬁcient
investment
nvt =  a0 +  a1Growtht−1 +  a2Levt−1 +  a3Casht−1 +  a4Sizet−1
+  a5Rett−1 +  a6Invt−1 +  a7Industry1−11 (1)
he  variables  in  the  model  (1)  are  deﬁned  as  following:  Invt
s  the  ratio  of  cash  paid  for  ﬁxed  assets,  intangible  assets  and
ther  long-term  assets  to  total  assets  for  year  t;  Growtht − 1
s  the  growth  rate  of  gross  operating  income  for  year  t  −  1;
evt − 1 is  the  asset-liability  ratio  for  year  t −  1;  Casht − 1 is
he  ratio  of  sum  of  cash  and  tradable  ﬁnancial  assets  to  total
ssets  for  year  t −  1;  Sizet − 1 is  the  natural  logarithm  of  total
ssets  for  year  t −  1;  Rett − 1 is  annual  rate  of  stock-market
eturns  for  year  t  −  1;  Invt − 1 is  the  ratio  of  cash  paid  for
xed  assets,  intangible  assets  and  other  long-term  assets  to
otal  assets  for  year  t  −  1;  Industry1-11 are  dummy  variables
or  industry.
ndependent  variables
amily  ﬁrms  (FF):  We  ﬁrst  employ  a  dummy  variable  FF  to
ndicate  family  ﬁrms.  If  a  ﬁrm  is  identiﬁed  as  a  family  ﬁrm,
F  takes  the  value  of  1;  otherwise,  FF  equals  0.
Separation  of  family  ownership  and  control  (Sep):  Follow-
ng  Claessens  et  al.  (2000),  we  deﬁne  Sep  as  the  ratio  of  FO
nd  FC,  where  FO  is  the  fraction  of  cash-ﬂow  rights  held  by
amily,  and  FC  is  the  sum  of  cash-ﬂow  rights  of  the  weakest
inks  in  the  ownership  chain.1
Family  management  (FM):  the  proportion  of  family  mem-
ers  on  the  board  of  directors.
Family  involvement  (FI):  We  construct  this  indicator  to
apture  the  comprehensive  effect  of  FO,  FC  and  FM.  FI  is
alculated  as  the  mean  of  FO,  FC  and  FM.
The  quality  of  internal  control  (ICI):  We  use  the  evalua-
ion  method  of  internal  control  put  forward  by  Zhang  et  al.
2011)  and  employ  the  assessment  scores  of  the  realization
evel  of  control  objectives  as  the  proxy  of  internal  control
uality.3.2.3  Control  variables.
Firm  size  (Size).  We  use  the  natural  logarithm  of  total
ssets  as  the  proxy  of  ﬁrm  size.  There  are  two  opposite  views
bout  the  relationship  between  the  ﬁrm  size  and  agency
osts.  Danes  et  al.  (2007)  argue  that  larger  ﬁrms  usually
ave  sounder  systems  and  richer  resources,  which  helps  to
educe  agency  costs.  However,  Chu  (2009)  ﬁnds  that  more
ntimate  relationship  of  family  members  are  always  present
n  the  smaller  family  businesses,  which  can  alleviate  the1 Suppose that a family owns 10% of the stock of Firm A, which in
urn has 20% of the stock of Firm B. We would say that the family
wns 2% of the cash-ﬂow rights of Firm B (FO is 2%) and the family
ontrols 10% of Firm B (FC is 10%).
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Table  1  Descriptive  statistics  of  key  variables.
FO  FC  FM  Sep  ICI  AC1  AC2
Mean  35.0441  41.8884  15.9000  0.8395  0.0963  0.1039  0.0703
Median 31.8358  41.0000  12.5000  0.9000  0.0919  0.0767  0.0539
Std. dev.  14.3320  14.7972  11.4900  0.1825  0.1616  0.1266  0.0653
 
 
b
f
m
i
H
i
w
t
ﬂ
t
i
a
c
o
f
a
d
P
n
Z
s
o
2
u
t
t
i
M
A
d
e
t
a
i
c
t
n
a
p
a
A
A
A
R
D
D
d
(
f
c
i
f
m
i
t
E
t
2
o
e
C
T
EMinimum 5.9297  14.2200  0.0000
Maximum 78.1820  89.4100  100.0000
e  lower  (Chu,  2009).  But  with  the  advent  of  new  nuclear
amily,  interest  conﬂicts  between  family  members  become
ore  and  more  serious  (Karra  et  al.,  2006).  Therefore,  we
nclude  the  age  of  ﬁrm  as  the  control  variable  in  the  model.
Free  cash  ﬂow  (FCF).  According  to  Free  Cash  Flow
ypothesis  (Jensen,  1986),  executives  are  more  likely  to
nvest  and  consume  more  money  than  needed  in  the  ﬁrms
ith  abundant  free  cash  ﬂow  and  low  growth,  which  leads
o  the  increase  of  agency  costs.  So  we  control  for  free  cash
ow  in  the  model  and  use  the  following  formula  to  calculate
he  free  cash  ﬂow  (Jiang  and  Huang,  2009):
FCF  =  (net  cash  ﬂow  from  operating  activities  −  net  work-
ng  capital  changes  −  cash  paid  for  ﬁxed  assets,  intangible
ssets  and  other  long-term  assets)/total  assets.
Debt  ﬁnancing  (Lev).  Debt  contracts  not  only  reduce  free
ash  ﬂow,  but  also  increase  the  likelihood  of  bankruptcy
f  enterprise  and  unemployment  of  manager,  which  is
avourable  to  inhibit  the  opportunistic  behaviour  of  agents
nd  reduce  the  agency  costs  (Jesen,  1986).  So  we  use  the
ebt-to-assets  ratio  to  measure  the  level  of  debt  ﬁnancing.
Independent  audit  (Big4).  High-quality  audit  of  Certiﬁed
ublic  Accountants  is  proved  to  be  an  effective  gover-
ance  mechanism  to  mitigate  the  agency  costs  (Watts  and
immerman,  1986;  Beatty,  1989).  Prior  empirical  results
how  that  the  audit  quality  of  Big-4  ﬁrms  is  higher  than  that
f  China’s  domestic  accounting  ﬁrms  (Qi  et  al.,  2004;  Pan,
008).  So  we  control  for  the  type  of  accounting  ﬁrms  by
sing  an  indicator  variable  Big4, which  equals  to  one  when
he  auditor  is  a  Big-4  ﬁrm;  and  zero  otherwise.
Industry  (Indus1-11).  According  to  the  industry  classiﬁca-
ions  set  by  China  Securities  Regulatory  Commission,  we
nclude  11  control  variables  of  industry  in  the  model.
odel  speciﬁcations
ccording  to  the  hypotheses  developed  and  the  variables
eﬁned  above,  the  following  multiple  linear  regression  mod-
ls  are  employed  to  analyze  the  agency  costs  of  family  ﬁrms:
he  model  (2)  only  include  the  proxy  of  ﬁrm  property  (FF)
nd  control  variables  to  test  H1;  the  model  (3)  includes  fam-
ly  ownership  (FO),  the  separation  of  family  ownership  and
ontrol  (Sep)  and  family  management  (FM)  to  test  H2-42;  In
he  model  (4),  we  introduce  family  involvement  (FI),  inter-
al  control  quality(ICI)  and  an  interaction  term  between  FI
nd  ICI  to  test  H5.
2 As FO is highly correlated with CO (correlation is 0.8388,
 < 0.001), we do not include them in the model simultaneously to
void multicolinearity.
f
d
m
n
c
t
j0.2471  -1.2813  0.0034  0.0058
1.0000  1.3458  1.6372  0.5188
C1(AC2)  =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1FF  +  ˇ2Size  +  ˇ3Age  +  ˇ4FCF  +  ˇ5Lev
+  ˇ6Big4  +  ˇ7−1∼11Indus1-11 +  ε (2)
C1(AC2)  =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1FO  +  ˇ2Sep  +  ˇ3FM  +  ˇ4Size  +  ˇ5Age
+  ˇ6FCF  +  ˇ7Lev
+  ˇ8Big4  +  ˇ9−1∼11Indus1−11 +  ε (3)
C1(AC2) =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1FI  +  ˇ2ICI  +  ˇ3FI  ∗  ICI  +  ˇ4Size  +  ˇ5Age
+  ˇ6FCF  +  ˇ7Lev  +  ˇ8Big4
+  ˇ9−1∼11Indus1−11 +  ε  (4)
esults
escriptive  statistics
escriptive  statistics  for  the  independent  variables  and
ependent  variables  are  provided  in  Table  1.  The  mean
median)  of  family  management  (FM)  is  15.9(12.5)  and
ar  smaller  than  that  of  family  ownership  (FO)  and  family
ontrol  (FC),  which  indicates  that  family  members’  partic-
pation  in  management  does  not  match  with  the  level  of
amily  ownership  and  control  in  Chinese  family  ﬁrms.  The
ean  of  separation  of  family  ownership  and  control  (Sep)
s  0.8395.  According  to  prior  studies,  the  average  separa-
ion  of  ownership  and  control  for  2980  corporations  in  nine
ast  Asian  countries  is  0.746  (Claessens  et  al.,  2000)  and
hat  of  western  family  enterprises  is  0.868  (Faccio  and  Lang,
002).  Our  result  indicates  that  the  separation  degree  of
wnership  and  control  of  Chinese  family  ﬁrms  is  still  mod-
rate.
orrelation  analysis
he  Pearson  correlation  matrix  is  provided  in  Table  2.
xcept  the  correlation  between  family  ownership  (FO)  and
amily  control  (FC),  other  correlations  among  the  indepen-
ent  variables  are  all  less  than  0.5  and  exhibit  no  serious
ulticollinearity.  Dependent  variable  AC1  is  signiﬁcantly
egatively  associated  with  family  ownership  (FO),  family
ontrol  (FC)  and  family  management  (FM),  which  indicates
hat  ﬁrms  with  higher  level  of  family  involvement  are  sub-
ected  to  lower  agency  costs.  Such  a  result  is  consistent  with
Family  involvement,  internal  control  and  agency  costs  49
Table  2  Pearson  correlation  coefﬁcients.
FC  FO  FM  Sep  ICI  AC1  AC2
FC  1.0000
FO  0.8388*** 1.0000
FM 0.1784  0.1749* 1.0000
Sep −0.0626  0.4625  0.0282  1.0000
ICI 0.1774  0.1367** −0.0053  −0.0237  1.0000
AC1 −0.2037* −0.1504* −0.0968  0.0513* −0.1305* 1.0000
AC2 −0.0256** −0.0307 0.0104 0.0356** −0.0231  −0.2912  1.0000
* Means p < 0.10.
** Means p < 0.01.
***
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iMeans p < 0.001
H2  and  H4.  As  expected,  dependent  variables  (AC1,  AC2)  are
negatively  associated  with  the  quality  of  internal  control
(ICI).
Regression  results
In  order  to  test  hypothesis  H1,  we  regress  model  (2)  for
our  base  sample  of  2177  non-ﬁnancial  companies  listed  on
Chinese  Shanghai  and  Shenzhen  Stock  Exchange  in  2012.
The  results  are  reported  in  Table  3.  The  Adjusted  R2 equals
to  0.1517  (when  the  dependent  variable  is  AC1)  and  0.0814
(when  dependent  variable  for  the  AC2).  The  variance
inﬂation  factor  (VIF)  of  independent  variables  are  all  less
than  2  and  the  average  VIF  is  1.28,  which  also  indicates
that  multicollinearity  between  independent  variables  is
not  serious.  The  coefﬁcient  for  FF  is  0.002(P =  0.375)  when
dependent  variable  is  AC1,  which  is  inconsistent  with  the
expected  sign;  the  coefﬁcient  for  FF  is  −0.027(P =  0.404)
when  dependent  variable  is  AC2,  which  is  consistent  with
expected  sign  but  not  signiﬁcant.  These  results  indicate
that  Chinese  family  ﬁrms  do  not  outperform  non-family
ﬁrms  in  controlling  agency  costs,  and  that  the  perquisite
consumption  of  senior  executives  is  even  higher  than  that
of  non-family  ﬁrms.  Our  hypothesis  (H1)  is  not  supported.
We  interpret  the  results  that  it  may  reﬂect  the  complexity
of  agency  problems  of  family  ﬁrms.  Family  ﬁrms  are  not  a
homogeneous  group.  The  differences  in  family  involvement
i
i
b
i
Table  3  OLS  regression  results  of  model  (2).
Expected  sign  AC1  
B  t  
(Constant)  13.9
FF −  0.002  0.5
Size −  −0.030  −14.2
FCF +  0.006  5.8
Level −  −0.017  −3.5
Big4 −  −0.006  −0.2
Age ?  0.013  3.6
Indus1-11 Controlled
Adj  R2 0.1517  nd  governance  mechanism  may  inﬂuence  the  level  of
gency  costs,  therefore  further  analysis  is  needed.
To  further  evaluate  the  effect  of  family  involvement  on
he  agency  costs,  we  conﬁne  our  sample  to  the  family-
ontrolled  ﬁrms  and  introduce  the  variables  of  family
wnership  (FO),  the  separation  of  family  ownership  and  con-
rol  (Sep)  and  family  management  (FM)  in  model  (3).  The
egression  results  are  reported  in  Table  4.  Some  ﬁndings  are
oteworthy.  First,  compared  with  model  (2),  the  explana-
ory  power  of  model  (3)  is  improved  signiﬁcantly.  Adjust  R2
f  model  (3)  equals  to  0.3072  (when  the  dependent  vari-
ble  is  AC1)  and  0.1058  (when  the  dependent  variable  is
C2),  which  shows  that  the  inclusion  of  family  involvement
oes  help  to  explain  the  agency  costs  of  family  ﬁrms  in
hina.  Second,  the  coefﬁcient  of  family  ownership  (FO)  is
ositive,  which  is  inconsistent  with  H2. One  possible  expla-
ation  for  this  is  that  many  controlling  families  in  China
ust  hold  the  shares  and  do  not  participate  in  the  opera-
ion  of  the  ﬁrm,  so  the  inﬂuence  of  family  ownership  (FO)
n  agency  costs  is  weaken.  Third,  the  coefﬁcient  of  the
eparation  of  family  ownership  and  control  (Sep)  is  sig-
iﬁcantly  negative  at  the  0.05  level.  This  result  support
ur  hypothesis  (H3)  that  when  the  ownership  of  the  family
s  different  from  (especially  less  than)  the  control,  fam-
ly  agents  are  more  likely  to  seek  personal  gains  or  family
nterests,  thus  exacerbating  the  agency  costs  of  the  whole
usiness.  Finally,  the  coefﬁcient  of  family  management  (FM)
s  signiﬁcantly  negative,  which  is  consistent  with  H4.  Family
AC2
p  B  t p
6  0.000  7.9  0.000
0  0.615  −0.027  −0.84  0.404
6  0.000  −0.048  −3.46  0.001
8  0.000  0.002  4.68  0.000
2  0.000  0.441  0.79  0.432
7  0.790  −0.003  −1.04  0.299
5  0.000  −0.011  −2.91  0.004
0.0814
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Table  4  OLS  regression  results  of  model  (3).
Expected  sign  AC1  AC2
B  t  p  B  t  p
(Constant)  3.80  0.000
FO −  0.012  1.22  0.224  0.001  0.64  0.522
Sep −  −0.121  3.41  0.001  −0.133  1.96  0.052
FM −  −0.023  −4.05  0.000  −0.091  −2.54  0.012
Size −  −0.046  −1.00  0.321  −0.016  −3.18  0.002
FCF +  0.236  0.50  0.619  2.561  0.96  0.336
Level −  −0.116  −3.37  0.001  −0.024  −0.87  0.383
Big4 −  −0.021 −0.71 0.479  −0.061  −1.14  0.254
Age ?  0.002  1.48 0.139 −0.008  −1.33  0.184
Indus1-11 Controlled
Adj R2 0.3072  0.1058
Table  5  OLS  regression  results  of  model  (4).
Expected  sign AC1  AC2
B  t  p  B  T  p
(Constant)  2.82  0.005  0.73  1.380
FI −  −0.094  −1.08  0.281  −0.001  −1.04  0.301
ICI −  −0.117  −3.42  0.001  −0.080  −1.17  0.244
FI*ICI −  −0.015  −2.33  0.020  −0.094  −2.63  0.009
Size −  −0.001  −2.18  0.030  −0.017  −3.48  0.001
FCF +  0.012  1.29  0.197  −0.062  −1.18  0.240
Level −  0.012  1.02  0.307  0.005  1.93  0.054
Big4 −  0.000  0.53  0.597  −0.012  −1.01  0.314
Age ?  0.002  1.69  0.092  −0.027  −1.01  0.315
Indus1-11 Controlled
Adj R2 0.1302  0.2514
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tembers  being  the  agents,  their  purposes  are  more  closely
elated  with  that  of  the  whole  ﬁrm,  so  that  family  involve-
ent  in  management  can  effectively  reduce  the  agency
osts.
In  order  to  evaluate  the  moderating  effect  of  internal
ontrol  on  the  relationship  between  family  involvement  and
gency  costs,  we  include  an  interaction  variable  between
amily  involvement  (FI)  and  internal  control  (ICI)  in  model
4).  Regression  results  are  shown  in  Table  5.  When  the
ependent  variable  is  AC1(AC2),  the  coefﬁcient  of  internal
ontrol  (ICI)  is  −0.117  (−0.080)  respectively,  which  indi-
ates  that  internal  control  not  only  effectively  reduce  the
erquisite  consumption  of  executives,  but  also  inhibit  the
nefﬁcient  investment.  The  coefﬁcient  of  family  involve-
ent  (FI)  is  insigniﬁcantly  negative,  but  the  coefﬁcient  of
he  interaction  variable  between  family  involvement  (FI)
nd  internal  control  (ICI)  is  signiﬁcantly  negative.  Such
 result  found  in  our  study  shows  that  the  relationship
etween  family  involvement  and  agency  costs  is  moder-
ted  on  the  quality  of  internal  control.  In  other  words,
nly  ﬁrms  establish  high-quality  internal  control,  can  fam-
ly  involvement  reduce  the  agency  costs  indeed.  As  a  result,
ur  hypothesis  (H5)  is  proved.
a
T
o
ionclusions
amily  ﬁrms  are  believed  to  be  the  organization  with  low-
st  agency  costs  (Fama  and  Jensen,  1983a,b).  In  this  paper,
e  compare  and  analyze  the  agency  costs  of  314  family
rms  and  1863  state-controlled  enterprises  listed  on  the  Chi-
ese  Shanghai  and  Shenzhen  Stock  Exchange  in  2012.  The
mpirical  results  show  that  Chinese  family  ﬁrms  do  not  have
igniﬁcant  advantage  over  state-controlled  enterprises  in
ontrolling  agency  costs,  and  the  agency  costs  associated
ith  perquisite  consumption  are  rather  higher  than  that  of
tate-controlled  enterprises.  We  still  ﬁnd  that  the  agency
osts  of  family  ﬁrms  rises  signiﬁcantly  with  the  increase
f  family  ownership  and  the  separation  of  ownership  and
ontrol,  and  family  involvement  in  management  is  signiﬁ-
antly  negatively  related  with  the  agency  costs.  At  last,  by
ntroducing  the  variable  of  internal  control  and  interaction
ariable  between  family  involvement  and  internal  control  in
he  model,  we  ﬁnd  that  the  impact  of  family  involvement  on
gency  costs  is  contingent  on  the  quality  of  internal  control.
hese  ﬁndings  contribute  to  the  current  empirical  literature
n  the  agency  problem  of  family  ﬁrms  and  provide  useful
mplications  for  practice.
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However,  this  study  has  some  limitations.  Firstly,  because
most  of  the  data  used  have  to  be  hand-collected,  we  only
use  the  cross-sectional  data  of  ﬁrms  in  2012  as  the  research
sample.  If  panel  data  are  used  in  analysis,  the  results
may  be  more  robust  and  convincing.  Secondly,  our  sam-
ple  only  includes  listed  family  ﬁrms,  which  only  account
for  a  small  portion  of  the  whole  group  of  family  ﬁrms  in
China.  Therefore,  caution  should  be  exercised  in  generaliz-
ing  these  results  to  the  family  ﬁrms  of  the  all.  Finally,  we
only  study  the  Agency  Problem  I,  which  exists  between  the
stockholders  and  managers.  As  for  the  Agency  Problem  I,
which  exists  between  majority  and  minority  shareholders,
has  not  been  take  into  account  in  this  study.  Further  research
involving  more  representative  samples  and  more  compre-
hensive  aspects  will  allow  researchers  to  develop  a  better
understanding  of  agency  problem  in  family  businesses.
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